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Title: State of the Union Addresses of William McKinley

Author: William McKinley

Release Date: February, 2004  [EBook #5031]
[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
[This file was first posted on April 11, 2002]
[Date last updated: December 16, 2004]

Edition: 11

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK OF ADDRESSES BY WILLIAM MCKINLEY ***




This eBook was produced by James Linden.

The addresses are separated by three asterisks: ***

Dates of addresses by William McKinley in this eBook:
  December 6, 1897
  December 5, 1898
  December 5, 1899
  December 3, 1900



***

State of the Union Address
William McKinley
December 6, 1897

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

It gives me pleasure to extend greeting to the Fifty-fifth Congress,
assembled in regular session at the seat of Government, with many of whose
Senators and Representatives I have been associated in the legislative
service. Their meeting occurs under felicitous conditions, justifying
sincere congratulation and calling for our grateful acknowledgment to a
beneficent Providence which has so signally blessed and prospered us as a
nation. Peace and good will with all the nations of the earth continue
unbroken.

A matter of genuine satisfaction is the growing feeling of fraternal regard
and unification of all sections of our country, the incompleteness of which
has too long delayed realization of the highest blessings of the Union. The
spirit of patriotism is universal and is ever increasing in fervor. The
public questions which now most engross us are lifted far above either
partisanship, prejudice, or former sectional differences. They affect every
part of our common country alike and permit of no division on ancient
lines. Questions of foreign policy, of revenue, the soundness of the
currency, the inviolability of national obligations, the improvement of the
public service, appeal to the individual conscience of every earnest
citizen to whatever party he belongs or in whatever section of the country
he may reside.

The extra session of this Congress which closed during July last enacted
important legislation, and while its full effect has not yet been realized,
what it has already accomplished assures us of its timeliness and wisdom.
To test its permanent value further time will be required, and the people,
satisfied with its operation and results thus far, are in no mind to
withhold from it a fair trial.

Tariff legislation having been settled by the extra session of Congress,
the question next pressing for consideration is that of the currency.

The work of putting our finances upon a sound basis, difficult as it may
seem, will appear easier when we recall the financial operations of the
Government since 1866. On the 30th day of June of that year we had
outstanding demand liabilities in the sum of $728,868,447.41. On the 1st of
January, 1879, these liabilities had been reduced to $443,889,495.88. Of our
interest-bearing obligations, the figures are even more striking. On July
1, 1866, the principal of the interest-bearing debt of the Government was
$2,332,331,208. On the 1st day of July, 1893, this sum had been reduced to
$585,137,100, or an aggregate reduction of $1,747,294,108. The
interest-bearing debt of the United States on the 1st day of December,
1897, was $847,365,620. The Government money now outstanding (December 1)
consists of $346,681,016 of United States notes, $107,793,280 of Treasury
notes issued by authority of the law of 1890, $384,963,504 of silver
certificates, and $61,280,761 of standard silver dollars.

With the great resources of the Government, and with the honorable example
of the past before us, we ought not to hesitate to enter upon a currency
revision which will make our demand obligations less onerous to the
Government and relieve our financial laws from ambiguity and doubt.

The brief review of what was accomplished from the close of the war to
1893, makes unreasonable and groundless any distrust either of our
financial ability or soundness; while the situation from 1893 to 1897 must
admonish Congress of the immediate necessity of so legislating as to make
the return of the conditions then prevailing impossible.

There are many plans proposed as a remedy for the evil. Before we can find
the true remedy we must appreciate the real evil. It is not that our
currency of every kind is not good, for every dollar of it is good; good
because the Government's pledge is out to keep it so, and that pledge will
not be broken. However, the guaranty of our purpose to keep the pledge will
be best shown by advancing toward its fulfillment.

The evil of the present system is found in the great cost to the Government
of maintaining the parity of our different forms of money, that is, keeping
all of them at par with gold. We surely cannot be longer heedless of the
burden this imposes upon the people, even under fairly prosperous
conditions, while the past four years have demonstrated that it is not only
an expensive charge upon the Government, but a dangerous menace to the
National credit.

It is manifest that we must devise some plan to protect the Government
against bond issues for repeated redemptions. We must either curtail the
opportunity for speculation, made easy by the multiplied redemptions of our
demand obligations, or increase the gold reserve for their redemption. We
have $900,000,000 of currency which the Government by solemn enactment has
undertaken to keep at par with gold. Nobody is obliged to redeem in gold
but the Government. The banks are not required to redeem in gold. The
Government is obliged to keep equal with gold all its outstanding currency
and coin obligations, while its receipts are not required to be paid in
gold. They are paid in every kind of money but gold, and the only means by
which the Government can with certainty get gold is by borrowing. It can
get it in no other way when it most needs it. The Government without any
fixed gold revenue is pledged to maintain gold redemption, which it has
steadily and faithfully done, and which, under the authority now given, it
will continue to do.

The law which requires the Government, after having redeemed its United
States notes, to pay them out again as current funds, demands a constant
replenishment of the gold reserve. This is especially so in times of
business panic and when the revenues are insufficient to meet the expenses
of the Government. At such times the Government has no other way to supply
its deficit and maintain redemption but through the increase of its bonded
debt, as during the Administration of my predecessor, when $262,315,400 of
four-and-a-half per cent bonds were issued and sold and the proceeds used
to pay the expenses of the Government in excess of the revenues and sustain
the gold reserve. While it is true that the greater part of the proceeds of
these bonds were used to supply deficient revenues, a considerable portion
was required to maintain the gold reserve.

With our revenues equal to our expenses, there would be no deficit
requiring the issuance of bonds. But if the gold reserve falls below
$100,000,000, how will it be replenished except by selling more bonds? Is
there any other way practicable under existing law? The serious question
then is, Shall we continue the policy that has been pursued in the past;
that is, when the gold reserve reaches the point of danger, issue more
bonds and supply the needed gold, or shall we provide other means to
prevent these recurring drains upon the gold reserve? If no further
legislation is had and the policy of selling bonds is to be continued, then
Congress should give the Secretary of the Treasury authority to sell bonds
at long or short periods, bearing a less rate of interest than is now
authorized by law.

I earnestly recommend, as soon as the receipts of the Government are quite
sufficient to pay all the expenses of the Government, that when any of the
United States notes are presented for redemption in gold and are redeemed
in gold, such notes shall be kept and set apart, and only paid out in
exchange for gold. This is an obvious duty. If the holder of the United
States note prefers the gold and gets it from the Government, he should not
receive back from the Government a United States note without paying gold
in exchange for it. The reason for this is made all the more apparent when
the Government issues an interest-bearing debt to provide gold for the
redemption of United States notes--a non-interest-bearing debt. Surely it
should not pay them out again except on demand and for gold. If they are
put out in any other way, they may return again to be followed by another
bond issue to redeem them--another interest-bearing debt to redeem a
non-interest-bearing debt.

In my view, it is of the utmost importance that the Government should be
relieved from the burden of providing all the gold required for exchanges
and export. This responsibility is alone borne by the Government, without
any of the usual and necessary banking powers to help itself. The banks do
not feel the strain of gold redemption. The whole strain rests upon the
Government, and the size of the gold reserve in the Treasury has come to
be, with or without reason, the signal of danger or of security. This ought
to be stopped.

If we are to have an era of prosperity in the country, with sufficient
receipts for the expenses of the Government, we may feel no immediate
embarrassment from our present currency; but the danger still exists, and
will be ever present, menacing us so long as the existing system continues.
And, besides, it is in times of adequate revenues and business tranquillity
that the Government should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid, without
serious consequences, the wise consideration and prompt solution of this
question.

The Secretary of the Treasury has outlined a plan, in great detail, for the
purpose of removing the threatened recurrence of a depleted gold reserve
and save us from future embarrassment on that account. To this plan I
invite your careful consideration.

I concur with the Secretary of the Treasury in his recommendation that
National banks be allowed to issue notes to the face value of the bonds
which they have deposited for circulation, and that the tax on circulating
notes secured by deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-half of one per
cent per annum. I also join him in recommending that authority be given for
the establishment of National banks with a minimum capital of $25,000. This
will enable the smaller villages and agricultural regions of the country to
be supplied with currency to meet their needs.

I recommend that the issue of National bank notes be restricted to the
denomination of ten dollars and upwards. If the suggestions I have herein
made shall have the approval of Congress, then I would recommend that
National banks be required to redeem their notes in gold.

The most important problem with which this Government is now called upon to
deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain and
the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in common with
those now existing have confronted this Government at various times in the
past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest, growing
discontent, an effort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and
self-control, of organized resistance to the mother country, of depression
after distress and warfare, and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by
renewed revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the
continental possessions of Spain in the Western Continent has the condition
of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United
States.

The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon the
island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home
Government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called
forth between 1823 and 1860 various emphatic declarations of the policy of
the United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain
unless in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through
purchase, nor has there been any change of this declared policy since upon
the part of the Government.

The revolution which began in 1868 lasted for ten years despite the
strenuous efforts of the successive peninsular governments to suppress it.
Then as now the Government of the United States testified its grave concern
and offered its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made
by General Grant were refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss
of life and treasure and increased injury to American interests, besides
throwing enhanced burdens of neutrality upon this Government. In 1878 peace
was brought about by the truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations between
the Spanish commander, Martinez de Campos, and the insurgent leaders.

The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not my purpose
at this time to recall its remarkable increase or to characterize its
tenacious resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by
Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every
quarter of the island, developing wide proportions and defying the efforts
of Spain for its suppression. The civilized code of war has been
disregarded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans.

The existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the American
people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our
people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to
see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of
self-control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their
right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.

The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly
offices of this Government, failed. Any mediation on our part was not
accepted. In brief, the answer read: "There is no effectual way to pacify
Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the
mother country." Then only could Spain act in the promised direction, of
her own motion and after her own plans.

The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The
productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The
agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their
lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late
cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of
cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war
measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination.

Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated
occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this Government. There
was much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by
alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending
protracted judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant
demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under
arrest. Before the change of the Spanish cabinet in October last twenty-two
prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom.

For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict the
aid of Congress was sought in a special message, and under the
appropriation of May 24, 1897, effective aid has been given to American
citizens in Cuba, many of them at their own request having been returned to
the United States.

The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure
for his post directed him to impress upon that Government the sincere wish
of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba
by reaching a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable alike to
Spain and to the Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and
duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entails, the burdens and
restraints it imposes upon us, with constant disturbance of national
interests, and the injury resulting from an indefinite continuance of this
state of things. It was stated that at this juncture our Government was
constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her
own volition, moved by her own interests and every sentiment of humanity,
should put a stop to this destructive war and make proposals of settlement
honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony. It was urged that as a
neighboring nation, with large interests in Cuba, we could be required to
wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its
authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island;
that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment
of this result.

No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to
Spain could attach, and, indeed, precise proposals were withheld to avoid
embarrassment to that Government. All that was asked or expected was that
some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It
so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed to the same
Spanish administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor,
and which for more than two years had poured men and treasure into Cuba in
the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the
departure of General Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain the
statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an
assassin, and although the cabinet of the late premier still held office
and received from our envoy the proposals he bore, that cabinet gave place
within a few days thereafter to a new administration, under the leadership
of Sagasta.

The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the
direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes
of this Government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the
war in Cuba and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the
present Spanish government is bound by every consideration to a change of
policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a
reasonable time. To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the
political reforms heretofore advocated by the present premier, without
halting for any consideration in the path which in its judgment leads to
peace. The military operations, it is said, will continue, but will be
humane and conducted with all regard for private rights, being accompanied
by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba while guarding Spanish
sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result in investing Cuba with a
distinct personality, the island to be governed by an executive and by a
local council or chamber, reserving to Spain the control of the foreign
relations, the army and navy, and the judicial administration. To
accomplish this the present government proposes to modify existing
legislation by decree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban
senators and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly
distribute the existing debt.

In the absence of a declaration of the measures that this Government
proposes to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices, it suggests
that Spain be left free to conduct military operations and grant political
reforms, while the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral
obligations and cut off the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents
receive from this country. The supposition of an indefinite prolongation of
the war is denied. It is asserted that the western provinces are already
well-nigh reclaimed, that the planting of cane and tobacco therein has been
resumed, and that by force of arms and new and ample reforms very early and
complete pacification is hoped for.

The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new
administration of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewithal the
disturbance and all occasion for any change of attitude on the part of the
United States. Discussion of the question of the international duties and
responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them is
presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this
regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been
made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this Government
has made, at the cost of millions and by the employment of the
administrative machinery of the nation at command, to perform its full duty
according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented the
departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores
in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this
aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm
in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this
charge has been made in diplomatic course.

Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government
has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to
itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high
sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions
of our own people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.

Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as
belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of
forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of
morality, would be criminal aggression.

Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable, step both in regard to the
previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful
that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion
by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring
or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and
during the extra session the Senate voted a joint resolution of like
import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the House of
Representatives. In the presence of these significant expressions of the
sentiment of the legislative branch it behooves the Executive to soberly
consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest
for justification. It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban
insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which
alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession,
in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents
and the conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war
are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of
belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle upon
the internal polity of the recognizing state.

The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December
7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may
be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for
seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter
disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of
humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations
of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that
productive region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial
nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of
proximity and larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant
uttered these words, which now, as then, sum up the elements of the
problem: A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion,
impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is
that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the
contest.

In a former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question,
and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and
devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of
war. It is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of Spain
herself, of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such
recognition. But now, as in its past history, the United States should
carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of
doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly
to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right
and honest and of good report. The question of according or of withholding
rights of belligerency must be judged in every case in view of the
particular attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always,
and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of
moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is required, when
the interests and rights of another government or of its people are so far
affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its
relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will
be recognized in the sense of international law as war. Belligerence, too,
is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their
occasional conflicts do not constitute war in the sense referred to.
Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized
by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been
observed by nations of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive
or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the
existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and
manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary
functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with
courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation,
possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of
territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious
insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it on the terrible footing
of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. The
contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not possessed
itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it
any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military
lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and
difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate
upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular
officers of other powers calls for the definition of their relations to the
parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard
the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature as
I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right. Such
recognition entails upon the country according the rights which flow from
it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the
contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and
obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels
of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of
war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in the
vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure; it
would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent
Government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would
invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our
treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of
which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and the Gulf States and between
all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes through the waters which
wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail
to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful
relations of the two States. There can be little doubt to what result such
supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the
United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result by measures of
questionable right or expediency or by any indirection. Turning to the
practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its
inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considerations
appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked
recognition of belligerency, unaccompanied by the assumption of
international neutrality. Such recognition, without more, will not confer
upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually
possessed or affect the relation of either party to other states. The act
of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of
neutrality, which recites the de facto condition of belligerency as its
motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality in the declaring state.
It assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a
public state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the
jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate those rigorous
obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the
consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of
vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty
law must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of
a proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent
rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be
imposed on both, which, while nominally equal, would weigh heavily in
behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of
Cuba, her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the military
investment of the island, but up to the margin of our own territorial
waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans within
their own domain could not hope to create a parallel, while its creation
through aid or sympathy from within our domain would be even more
impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international
neutrality we would perforce assume.

The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only
be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable
by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no
jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United
States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within
the paramount authority of Spain according to the international code of
war.

For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban
insurgents as now unwise, and therefore inadmissible. Should that step
hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty, the Executive will
take it.

Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and
has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But
should such a step be now taken, when it is apparent that a hopeful change
has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has
taken office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the
declaration that all the effort in the world can not suffice to maintain
peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after
subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem; that with a
substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare
for one in harmony with a new policy, which shall no longer aim to drive
the Cubans to the "horrible alternative of taking to the thicket or
succumbing in misery;" that reforms must be instituted in accordance with
the needs and circumstances of the time, and that these reforms, while
designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create a virtual entity
and self-controlled administration, shall yet conserve and affirm the
sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of powers and burdens upon a
basis of mutual interest untainted by methods of selfish expediency.

The first acts of the new government lie in these honorable paths. The
policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal
sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military commander a
broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already been set on foot to
relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the Spanish armies, it is
asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin and desolation, but to protect
the resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries.
That past methods are futile to force a peace by subjugation is freely
admitted, and that ruin without conciliation must inevitably fail to win
for Spain the fidelity of a contented dependency.

Decrees in application of the foreshadowed reforms have already been
promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but as
furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister are: All civil and
electoral rights of peninsular Spaniards are, in virtue of existing
constitutional authority, forthwith extended to colonial Spaniards. A
scheme of autonomy has been proclaimed by decree, to become effective upon
ratification by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament, which, with the
insular executive, can consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local
order and interests, possessing unlimited powers save as to matters of
state, war, and the navy, as to which the Governor-General acts by his own
authority as the delegate of the central Government. This parliament
receives the oath of the Governor-General to preserve faithfully the
liberties and privileges of the colony, and to it the colonial secretaries
are responsible. It has the right to propose to the central Government,
through the Governor-General, modifications of the national charter and to
invite new projects of law or executive measures in the interest of the
colony.

Besides its local powers, it is competent, first, to regulate electoral
registration and procedure and prescribe the qualifications of electors and
the manner of exercising suffrage; second, to organize courts of justice
with native judges from members of the local bar; third, to frame the
insular budget, both as to expenditures and revenues, without limitation of
any kind, and to set apart the revenues to meet the Cuban share of the
national budget, which latter will be voted by the national Cortes with the
assistance of Cuban senators and deputies; fourth, to initiate or take part
in the negotiations of the national Government for commercial treaties
which may affect Cuban interests; fifth, to accept or reject commercial
treaties which the national Government may have concluded without the
participation of the Cuban government; sixth, to frame the colonial tariff,
acting in accord with the peninsular Government in scheduling articles of
mutual commerce between the mother country and the colonies. Before
introducing or voting upon a bill the Cuban government or the chambers will
lay the project before the central Government and hear its opinion thereon,
all the correspondence in such regard being made public. Finally, all
conflicts of jurisdiction arising between the different municipal,
provincial, and insular assemblies, or between the latter and the insular
executive power, and which from their nature may not be referable to the
central Government for decision, shall be submitted to the courts.

That the government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which
recession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the
few weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its
professions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should
impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is
honestly due to Spain and to our friendly relations with Spain that she
should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to
prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands
irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose brutal orders
inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has
modified the horrible order of concentration and has undertaken to care for
the helpless and permit those who desire to resume the cultivation of their
fields to do so, and assures them of the protection of the Spanish
Government in their lawful occupations. She has just released the
Competitor prisoners, heretofore sentenced to death, and who have been the
subject of repeated diplomatic correspondence during both this and the
preceding Administration.

Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of
whom this Government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the
Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately
involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the
exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be
taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of
indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or
hesitancy in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to
the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and
honor, and to humanity.

Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only
by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor
selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights
and property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to
bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and
enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our
obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with
force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity
for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of
the civilized world.

By a special message dated the 16th day of June last, I laid before the
Senate a treaty signed that day by the plenipotentiaries of the United
States and of the Republic of Hawaii, having for its purpose the
incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands as an integral part of the United
States and under its sovereignty. The Senate having removed the injunction
of secrecy, although the treaty is still pending before that body, the
subject may be properly referred to in this Message because the necessary
action of the Congress is required to determine by legislation many details
of the eventual union should the fact of annexation be accomplished, as I
believe it should be.

While consistently disavowing from a very early period any aggressive
policy of absorption in regard to the Hawaiian group, a long series of
declarations through three-quarters of a century has proclaimed the vital
interest of the United States in the independent life of the Islands and
their intimate commercial dependence upon this country. At the same time it
has been repeatedly asserted that in no event could the entity of Hawaiian
statehood cease by the passage of the Islands under the domination or
influence of another power than the United States. Under these
circumstances, the logic of events required that annexation, heretofore
offered but declined, should in the ripeness of time come about as the
natural result of the strengthening ties that bind us to those Islands, and
be realized by the free will of the Hawaiian State.

That treaty was unanimously ratified without amendment by the Senate and
President of the Republic of Hawaii on the 10th of September last, and only
awaits the favorable action of the American Senate to effect the complete
absorption of the Islands into the domain of the United States. What the
conditions of such a union shall be, the political relation thereof to the
United States, the character of the local administration, the quality and
degree of the elective franchise of the inhabitants, the extension of the
federal laws to the territory or the enactment of special laws to fit the
peculiar condition thereof, the regulation if need be of the labor system
therein, are all matters which the treaty has wisely relegated to the
Congress.

If the treaty is confirmed as every consideration of dignity and honor
requires, the wisdom of Congress will see to it that, avoiding abrupt
assimilation of elements perhaps hardly yet fitted to share in the highest
franchises of citizenship, and having due regard to the geographical
conditions, the most just provisions for self-rule in local matters with
the largest political liberties as an integral part of our Nation will be
accorded to the Hawaiians. No less is due to a people who, after nearly
five years of demonstrated capacity to fulfill the obligations of
self-governing statehood, come of their free will to merge their destinies
in our body-politic.

The questions which have arisen between Japan and Hawaii by reason of the
treatment of Japanese laborers emigrating to the Islands under the
Hawaiian-Japanese convention of 1888, are in a satisfactory stage of
settlement by negotiation. This Government has not been invited to mediate,
and on the other hand has sought no intervention in that matter, further
than to evince its kindliest disposition toward such a speedy and direct
adjustment by the two sovereign States in interest as shall comport with
equity and honor. It is gratifying to learn that the apprehensions at first
displayed on the part of Japan lest the cessation of Hawaii's national life
through annexation might impair privileges to which Japan honorably laid
claim, have given place to confidence in the uprightness of this
Government, and in the sincerity of its purpose to deal with all possible
ulterior questions in the broadest spirit of friendliness.

As to the representation of this Government to Nicaragua, Salvador, and
Costa Rica, I have concluded that Mr. William L. Merry, confirmed as
minister of the United States to the States of Nicaragua, Salvador and
Costa Rica, shall proceed to San Jose, Costa Rica, and there temporarily
establish the headquarters of the United States to those three States. I
took this action for what I regarded as the paramount interests of this
country. It was developed upon an investigation by the Secretary of State
that the Government of Nicaragua, while not unwilling to receive Mr. Merry
in his diplomatic quality, was unable to do so because of the compact
concluded June 20, 1895, whereby that Republic and those of Salvador and
Honduras, forming what is known as the Greater Republic of Central America,
had surrendered to the representative Diet thereof their right to receive
and send diplomatic agents. The Diet was not willing to accept him because
he was not accredited to that body. I could not accredit him to that body
because the appropriation law of Congress did not permit it. Mr. Baker, the
present minister at Managua, has been directed to present his letters of
recall.

Mr. W. Godfrey Hunter has likewise been accredited to the Governments of
Guatemala and Honduras, the same as his predecessor. Guatemala is not a
member of the Greater Republic of Central America, but Honduras is. Should
this latter Government decline to receive him, he has been instructed to
report this fact to his Government and await its further instructions.

A subject of large importance to our country, and increasing appreciation
on the part of the people, is the completion of the great highway of trade
between the Atlantic and Pacific, known as the Nicaragua Canal. Its utility
and value to American commerce is universally admitted. The Commission
appointed under date of July 24 last "to continue the surveys and
examinations authorized by the act approved March 2, 1895," in regard to
"the proper route, feasibility, and cost of construction of the Nicaragua
Canal, with a view of making complete plans for the entire work of
construction of such canal," is now employed in the undertaking. In the
future I shall take occasion to transmit to Congress the report of this
Commission, making at the same time such further suggestions as may then
seem advisable.

Under the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1897, for the
promotion of an international agreement respecting bimetallism, I appointed
on the 14th day of April, 1897, Hon. Edward O. Wolcott of Colorado, Hon.
Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, and Hon. Charles J. Paine of Massachusetts,
as special envoys to represent the United States. They have been diligent
in their efforts to secure the concurrence and cooperation of European
countries in the international settlement of the question, but up to this
time have not been able to secure an agreement contemplated by their
mission.

The gratifying action of our great sister Republic of France in joining
this country in the attempt to bring about an agreement among the principal
commercial nations of Europe, whereby a fixed and relative value between
gold and silver shall be secured, furnishes assurance that we are not alone
among the larger nations of the world in realizing the international
character of the problem and in the desire of reaching some wise and
practical solution of it. The British Government has published a resume of
the steps taken jointly by the French ambassador in London and the special
envoys of the United States, with whom our ambassador at London actively
co-operated in the presentation of this subject to Her Majesty's
Government. This will be laid before Congress.

Our special envoys have not made their final report, as further
negotiations between the representatives of this Government and the
Governments of other countries are pending and in contemplation. They
believe that doubts which have been raised in certain quarters respecting
the position of maintaining the stability of the parity between the metals
and kindred questions may yet be solved by further negotiations.

Meanwhile it gives me satisfaction to state that the special envoys have
already demonstrated their ability and fitness to deal with the subject,
and it is to be earnestly hoped that their labors may result in an
international agreement which will bring about recognition of both gold and
silver as money upon such terms, and with such safeguards as will secure
the use of both metals upon a basis which shall work no injustice to any
class of our citizens.

In order to execute as early as possible the provisions of the third and
fourth sections of the Revenue Act, approved July 24, 1897, I appointed the
Hon. John A. Kasson of Iowa, a special commissioner plenipotentiary to
undertake the requisite negotiations with foreign countries desiring to
avail themselves of these provisions. The negotiations are now proceeding
with several Governments, both European and American. It is believed that
by a careful exercise of the powers conferred by that Act some grievances
of our own and of other countries in our mutual trade relations may be
either removed, or largely alleviated, and that the volume of our
commercial exchanges may be enlarged, with advantage to both contracting
parties.

Most desirable from every standpoint of national interest and patriotism is
the effort to extend our foreign commerce. To this end our merchant marine
should be improved and enlarged. We should do our full share of the
carrying trade of the world. We do not do it now. We should be the laggard
no longer. The inferiority of our merchant marine is justly humiliating to
the national pride. The Government by every proper constitutional means,
should aid in making our ships familiar visitors at every commercial port
of the world, thus opening up new and valuable markets to the surplus
products of the farm and the factory.

The efforts which had been made during the two previous years by my
predecessor to secure better protection to the fur seals in the North
Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, were renewed at an early date by this
Administration, and have been pursued with earnestness. Upon my invitation,
the Governments of Japan and Russia sent delegates to Washington, and an
international conference was held during the months of October and November
last, wherein it was unanimously agreed that under the existing regulations
this species of useful animals was threatened with extinction, and that an
international agreement of all the interested powers was necessary for
their adequate protection.

The Government of Great Britain did not see proper to be represented at
this conference, but subsequently sent to Washington, as delegates, the
expert commissioners of Great Britain and Canada who had, during the past
two years, visited the Pribilof Islands, and who met in conference similar
commissioners on the part of the United States. The result of this
conference was an agreement on important facts connected with the condition
of the seal herd, heretofore in dispute, which should place beyond
controversy the duty of the Governments concerned to adopt measures without
delay for the preservation and restoration of the herd. Negotiations to
this end are now in progress, the result of which I hope to be able to
report to Congress at an early day.

International arbitration cannot be omitted from the list of subjects
claiming our consideration. Events have only served to strengthen the
general views on this question expressed in my inaugural address. The best
sentiment of the civilized world is moving toward the settlement of
differences between nations without resorting to the horrors of war.
Treaties embodying these humane principles on broad lines, without in any
way imperiling our interests or our honor, shall have my constant
encouragement.

The acceptance by this Government of the invitation of the Republic of
France to participate in the Universal Exposition of 1900, at Paris, was
immediately followed by the appointment of a special commissioner to
represent the United States in the proposed exposition, with special
reference to the securing of space for an adequate exhibit on behalf of the
United States.

The special commissioner delayed his departure for Paris long enough to
ascertain the probable demand for space by American exhibitors. His
inquiries developed an almost unprecedented interest in the proposed
exposition, and the information thus acquired enabled him to justify an
application for a much larger allotment of space for the American section
than had been reserved by the exposition authorities. The result was
particularly gratifying, in view of the fact that the United States was one
of the last countries to accept the invitation of France.

The reception accorded our special commissioner was most cordial, and he
was given every reasonable assurance that the United States would receive a
consideration commensurate with the proportions of our exhibit. The report
of the special commissioner as to the magnitude and importance of the
coming exposition, and the great demand for space by American exhibitors,
supplies new arguments for a liberal and judicious appropriation by
Congress, to the end that an exhibit fairly representative of the
industries and resources of our country may be made in an exposition which
will illustrate the world's progress during the nineteenth century. That
exposition is intended to be the most important and comprehensive of the
long series of international exhibitions, of which our own at Chicago was a
brilliant example, and it is desirable that the United States should make a
worthy exhibit of American genius and skill and their unrivaled
achievements in every branch of industry.

The present immediately effective force of the Navy consists of four battle
ships of the first class, two of the second, and forty-eight other vessels,
ranging from armored cruisers to torpedo boats. There are under
construction five battle ships of the first class, sixteen torpedo boats,
and one submarine boat. No provision has yet been made for the armor of
three of the five battle ships, as it has been impossible to obtain it at
the price fixed by Congress. It is of great importance that Congress
provide this armor, as until then the ships are of no fighting value.

The present naval force, especially in view of its increase by the ships
now under construction, while not as large as that of a few other powers,
is a formidable force; its vessels are the very best of each type; and with
the increase that should be made to it from time to time in the future, and
careful attention to keeping it in a high state of efficiency and repair,
it is well adapted to the necessities of the country.

The great increase of the Navy which has taken place in recent years was
justified by the requirements for national defense, and has received public
approbation. The time has now arrived, however, when this increase, to
which the country is committed, should, for a time, take the form of
increased facilities commensurate with the increase of our naval vessels.
It is an unfortunate fact that there is only one dock on the Pacific Coast
capable of docking our largest ships, and only one on the Atlantic Coast,
and that the latter has for the last six or seven months been under repair
and therefore incapable of use. Immediate steps should be taken to provide
three or four docks of this capacity on the Atlantic Coast, at least one on
the Pacific Coast, and a floating dock in the Gulf. This is the
recommendation of a very competent Board, appointed to investigate the
subject. There should also be ample provision made for powder and
projectiles, and other munitions of war, and for an increased number of
officers and enlisted men. Some additions are also necessary to our
navy-yards, for the repair and care of our large number of vessels. As
there are now on the stocks five battle ships of the largest class, which
cannot be completed for a year or two, I concur with the recommendation of
the Secretary of the Navy for an appropriation authorizing the construction
of one battle ship for the Pacific Coast, where, at present, there is only
one in commission and one under construction, while on the Atlantic Coast
there are three in commission and four under construction; and also that
several torpedo boats be authorized in connection with our general system
of coast defense.

The Territory of Alaska requires the prompt and early attention of
Congress. The conditions now existing demand material changes in the laws
relating to the Territory. The great influx of population during the past
summer and fall and the prospect of a still larger immigration in the
spring will not permit us to longer neglect the extension of civil
authority within the Territory or postpone the establishment of a more
thorough government.

A general system of public surveys has not yet been extended to Alaska and
all entries thus far made in that district are upon special surveys. The
act of Congress extending to Alaska the mining laws of the United States
contained the reservation that it should not be construed to put in force
the general land laws of the country. By act approved March 3, 1891,
authority was given for entry of lands for town-site purposes and also for
the purchase of not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres then or
thereafter occupied for purposes of trade and manufacture. The purpose of
Congress as thus far expressed has been that only such rights should apply
to that Territory as should be specifically named.

It will be seen how much remains to be done for that vast and remote and
yet promising portion of our country. Special authority was given to the
President by the Act of Congress approved July 24, 1897, to divide that
Territory into two land districts and to designate the boundaries thereof
and to appoint registers and receivers of said land offices, and the
President was also authorized to appoint a surveyor-general for the entire
district. Pursuant to this authority, a surveyor-general and receiver have
been appointed, with offices at Sitka. If in the ensuing year the
conditions justify it, the additional land district authorized by law will
be established, with an office at some point in the Yukon Valley. No
appropriation, however, was made for this purpose, and that is now
necessary to be done for the two land districts into which the Territory is
to be divided.

I concur with the Secretary of War in his suggestions as to the necessity
for a military force in the Territory of Alaska for the protection of
persons and property. Already a small force, consisting of twenty-five men,
with two officers, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Randall, of the
Eighth Infantry, has been sent to St. Michael to establish a military
post.

As it is to the interest of the Government to encourage the development and
settlement of the country and its duty to follow up its citizens there with
the benefits of legal machinery, I earnestly urge upon Congress the
establishment of a system of government with such flexibility as will
enable it to adjust itself to the future areas of greatest population.

The startling though possibly exaggerated reports from the Yukon River
country, of the probable shortage of food for the large number of people
who are wintering there without the means of leaving the country are
confirmed in such measure as to justify bringing the matter to the
attention of Congress. Access to that country in winter can be had only by
the passes from Dyea and vicinity, which is a most difficult and perhaps an
impossible task. However, should these reports of the suffering of our
fellow-citizens be further verified, every effort at any cost should be
made to carry them relief.

For a number of years past it has been apparent that the conditions under
which the Five Civilized Tribes were established in the Indian Territory
under treaty provisions with the United States, with the right of
self-government and the exclusion of all white persons from within their
borders, have undergone so complete a change as to render the continuance
of the system thus inaugurated practically impossible. The total number of
the Five Civilized Tribes, as shown by the last census, is 45,494, and this
number has not materially increased; while the white population is
estimated at from 200,000 to 250,000 which, by permission of the Indian
Government has settled in the Territory. The present area of the Indian
Territory contains 25,694,564 acres, much of which is very fertile land.
The United States citizens residing in the Territory, most of whom have
gone there by invitation or with the consent of the tribal authorities,
have made permanent homes for themselves. Numerous towns have been built in
which from 500 to 5,000 white people now reside. Valuable residences and
business houses have been erected in many of them. Large business
enterprises are carried on in which vast sums of money are employed, and
yet these people, who have invested their capital in the development of the
productive resources of the country, are without title to the land they
occupy, and have no voice whatever in the government either of the Nations
or Tribes. Thousands of their children who were born in the Territory are
of school age, but the doors of the schools of the Nations are shut against
them, and what education they get is by private contribution. No provision
for the protection of the life or property of these white citizens is made
by the Tribal Governments and Courts.

The Secretary of the Interior reports that leading Indians have absorbed
great tracts of land to the exclusion of the common people, and government
by an Indian aristocracy has been practically established, to the detriment
of the people. It has been found impossible for the United States to keep
its citizens out of the Territory, and the executory conditions contained
in the treaties with these Nations have for the most part become impossible
of execution. Nor has it been possible for the Tribal Governments to secure
to each individual Indian his full enjoyment in common with Other Indians
of the common property of the Nations. Friends of the Indians have long
believed that the best interests of the Indians of the Five Civilized
Tribes would be found in American citizenship, with all the rights and
privileges which belong to that condition.

By section 16, of the act of March 3, 1893, the President was authorized to
appoint three commissioners to enter into negotiations with the Cherokee,
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Muscogee (or Creek), and Seminole Nations, commonly
known as the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian Territory. Briefly, the
purposes of the negotiations were to be: The extinguishment of Tribal
titles to any lands within that Territory now held by any and all such
Nations or Tribes, either by cession of the same or some part thereof to
the United States, or by allotment and division of the same in severalty
among the Indians of such Nations or Tribes respectively as may be entitled
to the same, or by such other method as may be agreed upon between the
several Nations and Tribes aforesaid, or each of them, with the United
States, with a view to such an adjustment upon the basis of justice and
equity as may, with the consent of the said Nations of Indians so far as
may be necessary, be requisite and suitable to enable the ultimate creation
of a State or States of the Union which shall embrace the lands within said
Indian Territory.

The Commission met much opposition from the beginning. The Indians were
very slow to act, and those in control manifested a decided disinclination
to meet with favor the propositions submitted to them. A little more than
three years after this organization the Commission effected an agreement
with the Choctaw Nation alone. The Chickasaws, however, refused to agree to
its terms, and as they have a common interest with the Choctaws in the
lands of said Nations, the agreement with the latter Nation could have no
effect without the consent of the former. On April 23, 1897, the Commission
effected an agreement with both tribes--the Choctaws and Chickasaws. This
agreement, it is understood, has been ratified by the constituted
authorities of the respective Tribes or Nations parties thereto, and only
requires ratification by Congress to make it binding.

On the 27th of September, 1897, an agreement was effected with the Creek
Nation, but it is understood that the National Council of said Nation has
refused to ratify the same. Negotiations are yet to be had with the
Cherokees, the most populous of the Five Civilized Tribes, and with the
Seminoles, the smallest in point of numbers and territory.

The provision in the Indian Appropriation Act, approved June 10, 1896,
makes it the duty of the Commission to investigate and determine the rights
of applicants for citizenship in the Five Civilized Tribes, and to make
complete census rolls of the citizens of said Tribes. The Commission is at
present engaged in this work among the Creeks, and has made appointments
for taking the census of these people up to and including the 30th of the
present month.

Should the agreement between the Choctaws and Chickasaws be ratified by
Congress and should the other Tribes fail to make an agreement with the
Commission, then it will be necessary that some legislation shall be had by
Congress, which, while just and honorable to the Indians, shall be
equitable to the white people who have settled upon these lands by
invitation of the Tribal Nations.

Hon. Henry L. Dawes, Chairman of the Commission, in a letter to the
Secretary of the Interior, under date of October 11, 1897, says:
"Individual ownership is, in their (the Commission's) opinion, absolutely
essential to any permanent improvement in present conditions, and the lack
of it is the root of nearly all the evils which so grievously afflict these
people. Allotment by agreement is the only possible method, unless the
United States Courts are clothed with the authority to apportion the lands
among the citizen Indians for whose use it was originally granted."

I concur with the Secretary of the Interior that there can be no cure for
the evils engendered by the perversion of these great trusts, excepting by
their resumption by the Government which created them.

The recent prevalence of yellow fever in a number of cities and towns
throughout the South has resulted in much disturbance of commerce, and
demonstrated the necessity of such amendments to our quarantine laws as
will make the regulations of the national quarantine authorities paramount.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in the portion of his report relating to the
operation of the Marine Hospital Service, calls attention to the defects in
the present quarantine laws, and recommends amendments thereto which will
give the Treasury Department the requisite authority to prevent the
invasion of epidemic diseases from foreign countries, and in times of
emergency, like that of the past summer, will add to the efficiency of the
sanitary measures for the protection of the people, and at the same time
prevent unnecessary restriction of commerce. I concur in his
recommendation.

In further effort to prevent the invasion of the United States by yellow
fever, the importance of the discovery of the exact cause of the disease,
which up to the present time has been undetermined, is obvious, and to this
end a systematic bacteriological investigation should be made. I therefore
recommend that Congress authorize the appointment of a commission by the
President, to consist of four expert bacteriologists, one to be selected
from the medical officers of the Marine Hospital Service, one to be
appointed from civil life, one to be detailed from the medical officers of
the Army, and one from the medical officers of the Navy.

The Union Pacific Railway, Main Line, was sold under the decree of the
United States Court for the District of Nebraska, on the 1st and 2d of
November of this year. The amount due the Government consisted of the
principal of the subsidy bonds, $27,236,512, and the accrued interest
thereon, $31,211,711.75, making the total indebtedness, $58,448,223.75. The
bid at the sale covered the first mortgage lien and the entire mortgage
claim of the Government, principal and interest.

The sale of the subsidized portion of the Kansas Pacific Line, upon which
the Government holds a second mortgage lien, has been postponed at the
instance of the Government to December 16, 1897. The debt of this division
of the Union Pacific Railway to the Government on November 1, 1897, was the
principal of the subsidy bonds, $6,303,000, and the unpaid and accrued
interest thereon, $6,626,690.33, making a total of $12,929,690.33.

The sale of this road was originally advertised for November 4, but for the
purpose of securing the utmost public notice of the event it was postponed
until December 16, and a second advertisement of the sale was made. By the
decree of the Court, the upset price on the sale of the Kansas Pacific will
yield to the Government the sum of $2,500,000 over all prior liens, costs,
and charges. If no other or better bid is made, this sum is all that the
Government will receive on its claim of nearly $13,000,000. The Government
has no information as to whether there will be other bidders or a better
bid than the minimum amount herein stated. The question presented therefore
is: Whether the Government shall, under the authority given it by the act
of March 3, 1887, purchase or redeem the road in the event that a bid is
not made by private parties covering the entire Government claim. To
qualify the Government to bid at the sales will require a deposit of
$900,000, as follows: In the Government cause $500,000 and in each of the
first mortgage causes $200,000, and in the latter the deposit must be in
cash. Payments at the sale are as follows: Upon the acceptance of the bid a
sum which with the amount already deposited shall equal fifteen per cent of
the bid; the balance in installments of twenty-five per cent thirty, forty,
and fifty days after the confirmation of the sale. The lien on the Kansas
Pacific prior to that of the Government on the 30th July, 1897, principal
and interest, amounted to $7,281,048.11. The Government, therefore, should
it become the highest bidder, will have to pay the amount of the first
mortgage lien.

I believe that under the act of 1887 it has the authority to do this and in
absence of any action by Congress I shall direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to make the necessary deposit as required by the Court's decree to
qualify as a bidder and to bid at the sale a sum which will at least equal
the principal of the debt due to the Government; but suggest in order to
remove all controversy that an amendment of the law be immediately passed
explicitly giving such powers and appropriating in general terms whatever
sum is sufficient therefor.

In so important a matter as the Government becoming the possible owner of
railroad property which it perforce must conduct and operate, I feel
constrained to lay before Congress these facts for its consideration and
action before the consummation of the sale. It is clear to my mind that the
Government should not permit the property to be sold at a price which will
yield less than one-half of the principal of its debt and less than
one-fifth of its entire debt, principal and interest. But whether the
Government, rather than accept less than its claim, should become a bidder
and thereby the owner of the property, I submit to the Congress for
action.

The Library building provided for by the act of Congress approved April 15,
1886, has been completed and opened to the public. It should be a matter of
congratulation that through the foresight and munificence of Congress the
nation possesses this noble treasure-house of knowledge. It is earnestly to
be hoped that having done so much toward the cause of education, Congress
will continue to develop the Library in every phase of research to the end
that it may be not only one of the most magnificent but among the richest
and most useful libraries in the world.

The important branch of our Government known as the Civil Service, the
practical improvement of which has long been a subject of earnest
discussion, has of late years received increased legislative and Executive
approval. During the past few months the service has been placed upon a
still firmer basis of business methods and personal merit. While the right
of our veteran soldiers to reinstatement in deserving cases has been
asserted, dismissals for merely political reasons have been carefully
guarded against, the examinations for admittance to the service enlarged
and at the same time rendered less technical and more practical; and a
distinct advance has been made by giving a hearing before dismissal upon
all cases where incompetency is charged or demand made for the removal of
officials in any of the Departments. This order has been made to give to
the accused his right to be heard but without in anyway impairing the power
of removal, which should always be exercised in cases of inefficiency and
incompetency, and which is one of the vital safeguards of the civil service
reform system, preventing stagnation and deadwood and keeping every
employee keenly alive to the fact that the security of his tenure depends
not on favor but on his own tested and carefully watched record of
service.

Much of course still remains to be accomplished before the system can be
made reasonably perfect for our needs. There are places now in the
classified service which ought to be exempted and others not classified may
properly be included. I shall not hesitate to exempt cases which I think
have been improperly included in the classified service or include those
which in my judgment will best promote the public service. The system has
the approval of the people and it will be my endeavor to uphold and extend
it.

I am forced by the length of this Message to omit many important references
to affairs of the Government with which Congress will have to deal at the
present session. They are fully discussed in the departmental reports, to
all of which I invite your earnest attention.

The estimates of the expenses of the Government by the several Departments
will, I am sure, have your careful scrutiny. While the Congress may not
find it an easy task to reduce the expenses of the Government, it should
not encourage their increase. These expenses will in my judgment admit of a
decrease in many branches of the Government without injury to the public
service. It is a commanding duty to keep the appropriations within the
receipts of the Government, and thus avoid a deficit.

***

State of the Union Address
William McKinley
December 5, 1898

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

Notwithstanding the added burdens rendered necessary by the war, our people
rejoice in a very satisfactory and steadily increasing degree of
prosperity, evidenced by the largest volume of business ever recorded.
Manufacture has been productive, agricultural pursuits have yielded
abundant returns, labor in all fields of industry is better rewarded,
revenue legislation passed by the present Congress has increased the
Treasury's receipts to the amount estimated by its authors, the finances of
the Government have been successfully administered and its credit advanced
to the first rank, while its currency has been maintained at the world's
highest standard. Military service under a common flag and for a righteous
cause has strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more
closely than ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the
country.

A review of the relation of the United States to other powers, always
appropriate, is this year of primary importance in view of the momentous
issues which have arisen, demanding in one instance the ultimate
determination by arms and involving far-reaching consequences which will
require the earnest attention of the Congress.

In my last annual message very full consideration was given to the question
of the duty of the Government of the United States toward Spain and the
Cuban insurrection as being by far the most important problem with which we
were then called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced and the
exposition of the views therein expressed disclosed my sense of the extreme
gravity of the situation. Setting aside as logically unfounded or
practically inadmissible the recognition of the Cuban insurgents as
belligerents, the recognition of the independence of Cuba, neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the
contestants, intervention in favor of one or the other party, and forcible
annexation of the island, I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly
relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to
realize her expectations of reform to which she had become irrevocably
committed. Within a few weeks previously she had announced comprehensive
plans which it was confidently asserted would be efficacious to remedy the
evils so deeply affecting our own country, so injurious to the true
interests of the mother country as well as to those of Cuba, and so
repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity.

The ensuing month brought little sign of real progress toward the
pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administrations set up in the capital
and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor of the
inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large extent of
territory held by the insurgents, while the military arm, obviously unable
to cope with the still active rebellion, continued many of the most
objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded
it. No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy
reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard and
the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of
zones of cultivation proved illusory. Indeed no less practical nor more
delusive promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted
and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear and
herded in a strange region among unsympathetic strangers hardly less
necessitous than themselves.

By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased.
Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these
distressed people at over 40 per cent from the time General Weyler's decree
of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish
authorities, a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions
raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the
consul-general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individual
effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands
of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such
forms of aid.

The war continued on the old footing, without comprehensive plan,
developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result,
that had marked the course of the earlier ten years' rebellion as well as
the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical
exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the
island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to
conjecture.

At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction of
the battle ship Maine while rightfully lying in the harbor of Havana on a
mission of international courtesy and good will--a catastrophe the
suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation's heart
profoundly. It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense
distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling upon
a generous people already deeply touched by preceding events in Cuba, did
not move them to an instant desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the
existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors that made
possible such a deed, by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct of justice
prevailed, and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the searching
investigation at once set on foot. The finding of the naval board of
inquiry established that the origin of the explosion was external, by a
submarine mine, and only halted through lack of positive testimony to fix
the responsibility of its authorship.

All these things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before the
finding of the naval court, that a crisis in our relations with Spain and
toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it needed but a
brief Executive suggestion to the Congress to receive immediate answer to
the duty of making instant provision for the possible and perhaps speedily
probable emergency of war, and the remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was
presented of a unanimous vote of both Houses, on the 9th of March,
appropriating $50,000,000 "for the national defense and for each and every
purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the
President." That this act of prevision came none too soon was disclosed
when the application of the fund was undertaken. Our coasts were
practically undefended. Our Navy needed large provision for increased
ammunition and supplies, and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack
from the navy of Spain, which comprised modern vessels of the highest type
of continental perfection. Our Army also required enlargement of men and
munitions. The details of the hurried preparation for the dreaded
contingency are told in the reports of the Secretaries of War and of the
Navy, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that the
outbreak of war when it did come found our nation not unprepared to meet
the conflict.

Nor was the apprehension of coming strife confined to our own country. It
was felt by the continental powers, which on April 6, through their
ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the Executive an expression of hope
that humanity and moderation might mark the course of this Government and
people, and that further negotiations would lead to an agreement which,
while securing the maintenance of peace, would afford all necessary
guaranties for the reestablishment of order in Cuba. In responding to that
representation I said I shared the hope the envoys had expressed that peace
might be preserved in a manner to terminate the chronic condition of
disturbance in Cuba, so injurious and menacing to our interests and
tranquillity, as well as shocking to our sentiments of humanity; and while
appreciating the humanitarian and disinterested character of the
communication they had made on behalf of the powers, I stated the
confidence of this Government, for its part, that equal appreciation would
be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to
humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which had
become insufferable.

Still animated by the hope of a peaceful solution and obeying the dictates
of duty, no effort was relaxed to bring about a speedy ending of the Cuban
struggle. Negotiations to this object continued actively with the
Government of Spain, looking to the immediate conclusion of a six months'
armistice in Cuba, with a view to effect the recognition of her people's
right to independence. Besides this, the instant revocation of the order of
reconcentration was asked, so that the sufferers, returning to their homes
and aided by united American and Spanish effort, might be put in a way to
support themselves and, by orderly resumption of the well-nigh destroyed
productive energies of the island, contribute to the restoration of its
tranquillity and well-being. Negotiations continued for some little time at
Madrid, resulting in offers by the Spanish Government which could not but
be regarded as inadequate. It was proposed to confide the preparation of
peace to the insular parliament, yet to be convened under the autonomous
decrees of November, 1897, but without impairment in any wise of the
constitutional powers of the Madrid Government, which to that end would
grant an armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for such time as the
general in chief might see fit to fix. How and with what scope of
discretionary powers the insular parliament was expected to set about the
"preparation" of peace did not appear. If it were to be by negotiation with
the insurgents, the issue seemed to rest on the one side with a body chosen
by a fraction of the electors in the districts under Spanish control, and
on the other with the insurgent population holding the interior country,
unrepresented in the so-called parliament and defiant at the suggestion of
suing for peace.

Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors to
reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole question
to the Congress. In the message of April 11, 1898, I announced that with
this last overture in the direction of immediate peace in Cuba and its
disappointing reception by Spain the effort of the Executive was brought to
an end. I again reviewed the alternative courses of action which had been
proposed, concluding that the only one consonant with international policy
and compatible with our firm-set historical traditions was intervention as
a neutral to stop the war and check the hopeless sacrifice of life, even
though that resort involved "hostile constraint upon both the parties to
the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement." The grounds justifying that step were the interests of
humanity, the duty to protect the life and property of our citizens in
Cuba, the right to check injury to our commerce and people through the
devastation of the island, and, most important, the need of removing at
once and forever the constant menace and the burdens entailed upon our
Government by the uncertainties and perils of the situation caused by the
unendurable disturbance in Cuba. I said: The long trial has proved that the
object for which Spain has waged the war can not be attained. The fire of
insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not
been and it is plain that it can not be extinguished by present methods.
The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be
endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in
the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which
give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must
stop. In view of all this the Congress was asked to authorize and empower
the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of
hostilities between Spain and the people of Cuba and to secure in the
island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining
order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and
tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and for
the accomplishment of those ends to use the military and naval forces of
the United States as might be necessary, with added authority to continue
generous relief to the starving people of Cuba.

The response of the Congress, after nine days of earnest deliberation,
during which the almost unanimous sentiment of your body was developed on
every point save as to the expediency of coupling the proposed action with
a formal recognition of the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful
government of that island--a proposition which failed of adoption--the
Congress, after conference, on the 19th of April, by a vote of 42 to 35 in
the Senate and 311 to 6 in the House of Representatives, passed the
memorable joint resolution declaring--

First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of
Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry
these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination
when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island
to its people. This resolution was approved by the Executive on the next
day, April 20. A copy was at once communicated to the Spanish minister at
this capital, who forthwith announced that his continuance in Washington
had thereby become impossible, and asked for his passports, which were
given him. He thereupon withdrew from Washington, leaving the protection of
Spanish interests in the United States to the French ambassador and the
Austro-Hungarian minister. Simultaneously with its communication to the
Spanish minister here, General Woodford, the American minister at Madrid,
was telegraphed confirmation of the text of the joint resolution and
directed to communicate it to the Government of Spain with the formal
demand that it at once relinquish its authority and government in the
island of Cuba and withdraw its forces therefrom, coupling this demand with
announcement of the intentions of this Government as to the future of the
island, in conformity with the fourth clause of the resolution, and giving
Spain until noon of April 23 to reply.

That demand, although, as above shown, officially made known to the Spanish
envoy here, was not delivered at Madrid. After the instruction reached
General Woodford on the morning of April 21, but before he could present
it, the Spanish minister of state notified him that upon the President's
approval of the joint resolution the Madrid Government, regarding the act
as "equivalent to an evident declaration of war," had ordered its minister
in Washington to withdraw, thereby breaking off diplomatic relations
between the two countries and ceasing all official communication between
their respective representatives. General Woodford thereupon demanded his
passports and quitted Madrid the same day.

Spain having thus denied the demand of the United States and initiated that
complete form of rupture of relations which attends a state of war, the
executive powers authorized by the resolution were at once used by me to
meet the enlarged contingency of actual war between sovereign states. On
April 22 I proclaimed a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including
ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of
Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, and on the 23d I called for
volunteers to execute the purpose of the resolution. By my message of April
25 the Congress was informed of the situation, and I recommended formal
declaration of the existence of a state of war between the United States
and Spain. The Congress accordingly voted on the same day the act approved
April 25, 1898, declaring the existence of such war from and including the
21st day of April, and reenacted the provision of the resolution of April
20 directing the President to use all the armed forces of the nation to
carry that act into effect. Due notification of the existence of war as
aforesaid was given April 25 by telegraph to all the governments with which
the United States maintain relations, in order that their neutrality might
be assured during the war. The various governments responded with
proclamations of neutrality, each after its own methods. It is not among
the least gratifying incidents of the struggle that the obligations of
neutrality were impartially discharged by all, often under delicate and
difficult circumstances.

In further fulfillment of international duty I issued, April 26, 1893, a
proclamation announcing the treatment proposed to be accorded to vessels
and their cargoes as to blockade, contraband, the exercise of the right of
search, and the immunity of neutral flags and neutral goods under enemy's
flag. A similar proclamation was made by the Spanish Government. In the
conduct of hostilities the rules of the Declaration of Paris, including
abstention from resort to privateering, have accordingly been observed by
both belligerents, although neither was a party to that declaration.

Our country thus, after an interval of half a century of peace with all
nations, found itself engaged in deadly conflict with a foreign enemy.
Every nerve was strained to meet the emergency. The response to the initial
call for 125,000 volunteers was instant and complete, as was also the
result of the second call, of May 25, for 75,000 additional volunteers. The
ranks of the Regular Army were increased to the limits provided by the act
of April 26, 1898.

The enlisted force of the Navy on the 15th day of August, when it reached
its maximum, numbered 24,123 men and apprentices. One hundred and three
vessels were added to the Navy by purchase, 1 was presented to the
Government, 1 leased, and the 4 vessels of the International Navigation
Company--the St. Paul, St. Louis, New York, and Paris--were chartered. In
addition to these the revenue cutters and lighthouse tenders were turned
over to the Navy Department and became temporarily a part of the auxiliary
Navy.

The maximum effective fighting force of the Navy during the war, separated
into classes, was as follows:

Four battle ships of the first class, 1 battle ship of the second class, 2
armored cruisers, 6 coast-defense monitors, 1 armored ram, 12 protected
cruisers, 3 unprotected cruisers, 18 gunboats, 1 dynamite cruiser, 11
torpedo boats; vessels of the old Navy, including monitors, 14. Auxiliary
Navy: 11 auxiliary cruisers, 28 converted yachts, 27 converted tugs, 19
converted colliers, 15 revenue cutters, 4 light-house tenders, and 19
miscellaneous vessels.

Much alarm was felt along our entire Atlantic seaboard lest some attack
might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent possible
injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary garrisons were
provided, drawn from the State militia; infantry and light batteries were
drawn from the volunteer force. About 12,000 troops were thus employed. The
coast signal service was established for observing the approach of an
enemy's ships to the coast of the United States, and the Life-Saving and
Light-House services cooperated, which enabled the Navy Department to have
all portions of the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Texas, under
observation.

The auxiliary Navy was created under the authority of Congress and was
officered and manned by the Naval Militia of the several States. This
organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second line of
defense. Under the direction of the Chief of Engineers submarine mines were
placed at the most exposed points. Before the outbreak of the war permanent
mining casemates and cable galleries had been constructed at nearly all
important harbors. Most of the torpedo material was not to be found in the
market, and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April 19
district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures short of
the actual attaching of the loaded mines to the cables, and on April 22
telegraphic orders were issued to place the loaded mines in position.

The aggregate number of mines placed was 1,535, at the principal harbors
from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting of
mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of the
Spanish fleet these mines were not placed.

The Signal Corps was promptly organized, and performed service of the most
difficult and important character. Its operations during the war covered
the electrical connection of all coast fortifications, the establishment of
telephonic and telegraphic facilities for the camps at Manila, Santiago,
and in Puerto Rico. There were constructed 300 miles of line at ten great
camps, thus facilitating military movements from those points in a manner
heretofore unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were
established and maintained under the enemy's fire at Manila, and later the
Manila-Hongkong cable was reopened.

In Puerto Rico cable communications were opened over a discontinued route,
and on land the headquarters of the commanding officer was kept in
telegraphic or telephonic communication with the division commanders on
four different lines of operations.

There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship, with
war cables and cable gear, suitable both for the destruction of
communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own. Two
ocean cables were destroyed under the enemy's batteries at Santiago. The
day previous to the landing of General Shafter's corps, at Caimanera,
within 20 miles of the landing place, cable communications were established
and a cable station opened giving direct communication with the Government
at Washington. This service was invaluable to the Executive in directing
the operations of the Army and Navy. With a total force of over 1,300, the
loss was by disease in camp and field, officers and men included, only 5.

The national-defense fund of $50,000,000 was expended in large part by the
Army and Navy, and the objects for which it was used are fully shown in the
reports of the several Secretaries. It was a most timely appropriation,
enabling the Government to strengthen its defenses and make preparations
greatly needed in case of war.

This fund being inadequate to the requirements of equipment and for the
conduct of the war, the patriotism of the Congress provided the means in
the war-revenue act of June 13 by authorizing a 3 per cent popular loan not
to exceed $400,000,000 and by levying additional imposts and taxes. Of the
authorized loan $200,000,000 were offered and promptly taken the
subscriptions so far exceeding the call as to cover it many times over,
while, preference being given to the smaller bids, no single allotment
exceeded $5,000. This was a most encouraging and significant result,
showing the vast resources of the nation and the determination of the
people to uphold their country's honor.

It is not within the province of this message to narrate the history of the
extraordinary war that followed the Spanish declaration of April 21, but a
brief recital of its more salient features is appropriate.

The first encounter of the war in point of date took place April 27, when a
detachment of the blockading squadron made a reconnoissance in force at
Matanzas, shelled the harbor forts, and demolished several new works in
construction.

The next engagement was destined to mark a memorable epoch in maritime
warfare. The Pacific fleet, under Commodore George Dewey, had lain for some
weeks at Hongkong. Upon the colonial proclamation of neutrality being
issued and the customary twenty-four hours' notice being given, it repaired
to Mirs Bay, near Hongkong, whence it proceeded to the Philippine Islands
under telegraphed orders to capture or destroy the formidable Spanish fleet
then assembled at Manila. At daybreak on the 1st of May the American force
entered Manila Bay, and after a few hours' engagement effected the total
destruction of the Spanish fleet, consisting of ten war ships and a
transport, besides capturing the naval station and forts at Cavite, thus
annihilating the Spanish naval power in the Pacific Ocean and completely
controlling the bay of Manila, with the ability to take the city at will.
Not a life was lost on our ships, the wounded only numbering seven, while
not a vessel was materially injured. For this gallant achievement the
Congress, upon my recommendation, fitly bestowed upon the actors preferment
and substantial reward.

The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and
upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility
thereby attached to our arms which continued throughout the struggle.
Reenforcements were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General
Merritt and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay
helpless before our guns.

On the 7th day of May the Government was advised officially of the victory
at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what troops
would be required. The information was received on the 15th day of May, and
the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived off Manila June 30.
Other expeditions soon followed, the total force consisting of 641 officers
and 15,058 enlisted men.

Only reluctance to cause needless loss of life and property prevented the
early storming and capture of the city, and therewith the absolute military
occupancy of the whole group. The insurgents meanwhile had resumed the
active hostilities suspended by the uncompleted truce of December, 1897.
Their forces invested Manila from the northern and eastern sides, but were
constrained by Admiral Dewey and General Merrill from attempting an
assault. It was fitting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive
operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of the
United States alone. Obeying the stern precept of war which enjoins the
overcoming of the adversary and the extinction of his power wherever
assailable as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory was
not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities
attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be thought
of.

Following the comprehensive scheme of general attack, powerful forces were
assembled at various points on our coast to invade Cuba and Puerto Rico.
Meanwhile naval demonstrations were made at several exposed points. On May
11 the cruiser Wilmington and torpedo boat Winslow were unsuccessful in an
attempt to silence the batteries at Cardenas, a gallant ensign, Worth
Bagley, and four seamen falling. These grievous fatalities were, strangely
enough, among the very few which occurred during our naval operations in
this extraordinary conflict.

Meanwhile the Spanish naval preparations had been pushed with great vigor.
A powerful squadron under Admiral Cervera, which had assembled at the Cape
Verde Islands before the outbreak of hostilities, had crossed the ocean,
and by its erratic movements in the Caribbean Sea delayed our military
plans while baffling the pursuit of our fleets. For a time fears were felt
lest the Oregon and Marietta, then nearing home after their long voyage
from San Francisco of over 15,000 miles, might be surprised by Admiral
Cervera's fleet, but their fortunate arrival dispelled these apprehensions
and lent much-needed reenforcement. Not until Admiral Cervera took refuge
in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, about May 19, was it practicable to plan
a systematic naval and military attack upon the Antillean possessions of
Spain.

Several demonstrations occurred on the coasts of Cuba and Puerto Rico in
preparation for the larger event. On May 13 the North Atlantic Squadron
shelled San Juan de Puerto Rico. On May 30 Commodore Schley's squadron
bombarded the forts guarding the mouth of Santiago Harbor. Neither attack
had any material result. It was evident that well-ordered land operations
were indispensable to achieve a decisive advantage.

The next act in the war thrilled not alone the hearts of our countrymen but
the world by its exceptional heroism. On the night of June 3 Lieutenant
Hobson, aided by seven devoted volunteers, blocked the narrow outlet from
Santiago Harbor by sinking the collier Merrimac in the channel, under a
fierce fire from the shore batteries, escaping with their lives as by a
miracle, but falling into the hands of the Spaniards. It is a most
gratifying incident of the war that the bravery of this little band of
heroes was cordially appreciated by the Spanish admiral, who sent a flag of
truce to notify Admiral Sampson of their safety and to compliment them on
their daring act. They were subsequently exchanged July 7.

By June 7 the cutting of the last Cuban cable isolated the island.
Thereafter the invasion was vigorously prosecuted. On June 10, under a
heavy protecting fire, a landing of 600 marines from the Oregon,
Marblehead, and Yankee was effected in Guantanamo Bay, where it had been
determined to establish a naval station.

This important and essential port was taken from the enemy, after severe
fighting, by the marines, who were the first organized force of the United
States to land in Cuba.

The position so won was held despite desperate attempts to dislodge our
forces. By June 16 additional forces were landed and strongly in-trenched.
On June 22 the advance of the invading army under Major-General Shafter
landed at Daiquiri, about 15 miles east of Santiago. This was accomplished
under great difficulties, but with marvelous dispatch. On June 23 the
movement against Santiago was begun. On the 24th the first serious
engagement took place, in which the First and Tenth Cavalry and the First
United States Volunteer Cavalry, General Young's brigade of General
Wheeler's division, participated, losing heavily. By nightfall, however,
ground within 5 miles of Santiago was won. The advantage was steadily
increased. On July 1 a severe battle took place, our forces gaining the
outworks of Santiago; on the 2d El Caney and San Juan were taken after a
desperate charge, and the investment of the city was completed. The Navy
cooperated by shelling the town and the coast forts.

On the day following this brilliant achievement of our land forces, the 3d
of July, occurred the decisive naval combat of the war. The Spanish fleet,
attempting to leave the harbor, was met by the American squadron under
command of Commodore Sampson. In less than three hours all the Spanish
ships were destroyed, the two torpedo boats being sunk and the Maria
Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya, and Cristobal Colon driven ashore. The
Spanish admiral and over 1,300 men were taken prisoners. While the enemy's
loss of life was deplorably large, some 600 perishing, on our side but one
man was killed, on the Brooklyn, and one man seriously wounded. Although
our ships were repeatedly struck, not one was seriously injured. Where all
so conspicuously distinguished themselves, from the commanders to the
gunners and the unnamed heroes in the boiler rooms, each and all
contributing toward the achievement of this astounding victory, for which
neither ancient nor modern history affords a parallel in the completeness
of the event and the marvelous disproportion of casualties, it would be
invidious to single out any for especial honor. Deserved promotion has
rewarded the more conspicuous actors. The nation's profoundest gratitude is
due to all of these brave men who by their skill and devotion in a few
short hours crushed the sea power of Spain and wrought a triumph whose
decisiveness and far-reaching consequences can scarcely be measured. Nor
can we be unmindful of the achievements of our builders, mechanics, and
artisans for their skill in the construction of our war ships.

With the catastrophe of Santiago Spain's effort upon the ocean virtually
ceased. A spasmodic effort toward the end of June to send her Mediterranean
fleet, under Admiral Camara, to relieve Manila was abandoned, the
expedition being recalled after it had passed through the Suez Canal.

The capitulation of Santiago followed. The city was closely besieged by
land, while the entrance of our ships into the harbor cut off all relief on
that side. After a truce to allow of the removal of noncombatants
protracted negotiations continued from July 3 until July 15, when, under
menace of immediate assault, the preliminaries of surrender were agreed
upon. On the 17th General Shafter occupied the city. The capitulation
embraced the entire eastern end of Cuba. The number of Spanish soldiers
surrendering was 22,000, all of whom were subsequently conveyed to Spain at
the charge of the United States. The story of this successful campaign is
told in the report of the Secretary of War, which will be laid before you.
The individual valor of officers and soldiers was never more strikingly
shown than in the several engagements leading to the surrender of Santiago,
while the prompt movements and successive victories won instant and
universal applause. To those who gained this complete triumph, which
established the ascendency of the United States upon land as the fight off
Santiago had fixed our supremacy on the seas, the earnest and lasting
gratitude of the nation is unsparingly due. Nor should we alone remember
the gallantry of the living; the dead claim our tears, and our losses by
battle and disease must cloud any exultation at the result and teach us to
weigh the awful cost of war, however rightful the cause or signal the
victory.

With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Puerto Rico became the next
strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been assigned to organize
an expedition for that purpose. Fortunately he was already at Santiago,
where he had arrived on the 11th of July with reenforcements for General
Shafter's army.

With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and artillery, two
companies of engineers, and one company of the Signal Corps, General Miles
left Guantanamo on July 21, having nine transports convoyed by the fleet
under Captain Higginson with the Massachusetts (flagship), Dixie,
Gloucester, Columbia, and Yale, the two latter carrying troops. The
expedition landed at Guanica July 25, which port was entered with little
opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the Annapolis and the Wasp, while
the Puritan and Amphitrite went to San Juan and joined the New Orleans,
which was engaged in blockading that port. The Major-General Commanding was
subsequently reenforced by General Schwan's brigade of the Third Army
Corps, by General Wilson with a part of his division, and also by General
Brooke with a part of his corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men.

On July 27 he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the island,
from which he thereafter directed operations for the capture of the
island.

With the exception of encounters with the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros,
Coamo, and Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there
was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor,
and by the 12th of August much of the island was in our possession and the
acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time. At most of
the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed.
Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for delivery from
Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage. As a potent influence
toward peace the outcome of the Puerto Rican expedition was of great
consequence, and generous commendation is due to those who participated in
it.

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manila, its starting place. On
August 15, after a brief assault upon the works by the land forces, in
which the squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally. The
casualties were comparatively few. By this the conquest of the Philippine
Islands, virtually accomplished when the Spanish capacity for resistance
was destroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of the 1st of May, was formally
sealed. To General Merrill, his officers and men, for their uncomplaining
and devoted service and for their gallantry in action, the nation is
sincerely grateful. Their long voyage was made with singular success, and
the soldierly conduct of the men, most of whom were without previous
experience in the military service, deserves unmeasured praise.

The total casualties in killed and wounded in the Army during the war with
Spain were: Officers killed, 23; enlisted men killed, 257; total, 280;
officers wounded, 113; enlisted men wounded, 1,464; total, 1,577. Of the
Navy: Killed, 17; wounded, 67; died as result of wounds, 1; invalided from
service, 6; total, 91.

It will be observed that while our Navy was engaged in two great battles
and in numerous perilous undertakings in blockade and bombardment, and more
than 50,000 of our troops were transported to distant lands and were
engaged in assault and siege and battle and many skirmishes in unfamiliar
territory, we lost in both arms of the service a total of 1,668 killed and
wounded; and in the entire campaign by land and sea we did not lose a gun
or a flag or a transport or a ship, and, with the exception of the crew of
the Merrimac, not a soldier or sailor was taken prisoner.

On August 7, forty-six days from the date of the landing of General
Shafter's army in Cuba and twenty-one days from the surrender of Santiago,
the United States troops commenced embarkation for home, and our entire
force was returned to the United States as early as August 24. They were
absent from the United States only two months.

It is fitting that I should bear testimony to the patriotism and devotion
of that large portion of our Army which, although eager to be ordered to
the post of greatest exposure, fortunately was not required outside of the
United States. They did their whole duty, and, like their comrades at the
front, have earned the gratitude of the nation. In like manner, the
officers and men of the Army and of the Navy who remained in their
departments and stations faithfully performing most important duties
connected with the war, and whose requests for assignment in the field and
at sea I was compelled to refuse because their services were indispensable
here, are entitled to the highest commendation. It is my regret that there
seems to be no provision for their suitable recognition.

In this connection it is a pleasure for me to mention in terms of cordial
appreciation the timely and useful work of the American National Red Cross,
both in relief measures preparatory to the campaigns, in sanitary
assistance at several of the camps of assemblage, and later, under the able
and experienced leadership of the president of the society, Miss Clara
Barton, on the fields of battle and in the hospitals at the front in Cuba.
Working in conjunction with the governmental authorities and under their
sanction and approval, and with the enthusiastic cooperation of many
patriotic women and societies in the various States, the Red Cross has
fully maintained its already high reputation for intense earnestness and
ability to exercise the noble purposes of its international organization,
thus justifying the confidence and support which it has received at the
hands of the American people. To the members and officers of this society
and all who aided them in their philanthropic work the sincere and lasting
gratitude of the soldiers and the public is due and is freely accorded.

In tracing these events we are constantly reminded of our obligations to
the Divine Master for His watchful care over us and His safe guidance, for
which the nation makes reverent acknowledgment and offers humble prayer for
the continuance of His favor.

The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the capitulation
of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish Government a realizing sense of
the hopelessness of continuing a struggle now become wholly unequal, it
made overtures of peace through the French ambassador, who, with the assent
of his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of Spanish
interests during the war. On the 26th of July M. Cambon presented a
communication signed by the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish minister of
state, inviting the United States to state the terms upon which it would be
willing to make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed to
the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of this Government
were announced substantially as in the protocol afterwards signed. On the
10th of August the Spanish reply, dated August 7, was handed by M. Cambon
to the Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms imposed as
to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and an island of the Ladrones group, but appeared to
seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to
the Philippine Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could
neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that in order to avoid
misunderstanding the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the
embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations
for peace were to be undertaken. The vague and inexplicit suggestions of
the Spanish note could not be accepted, the only reply being to present as
a virtual ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms
tendered to Spain in our note of July 30, with added stipulations of detail
as to the appointment of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the
Spanish Antilles. On August 12 M. Cambon announced his receipt of full
powers to sign the protocol so submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of
August 12, M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and the Secretary of
State, as the plenipotentiary of the United States, signed a protocol
providing--

ARTICLE I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title
to Cuba.

ART. II. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an
island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.

ART. III. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor
of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine
the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. The fourth
article provided for the appointment of joint commissions on the part of
the United States and Spain, to meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively,
for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated
evacuation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West
Indies.

The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more than five
commissioners on each side, to meet at Paris not later than October 1 and
to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject
to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two
countries.

The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of the protocol
hostilities between the two countries should be suspended and that notice
to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each Government to
the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol I issued a proclamation, of
August 12, suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The
necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The blockade
of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Puerto Rico was in like manner raised.
On the 18th of August the muster out of 100,000 volunteers, or as near that
number as was found to be practicable, was ordered.

On the 1st of December 101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and
discharged from the service, and 9,002 more will be mustered out by the
10th of this month; also a corresponding number of general and general
staff officers have been honorably discharged the service.

The military commissions to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed--for Cuba,
Major-General James F. Wade, Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General
Matthew C. Butler; for Puerto Rico, Major--General John R. Brooke,
Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, Brigadier-General William W. Gordon--who
soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and San Juan,
respectively. The Puerto Rican Joint Commission speedily accomplished its
task, and by the 18th of October the evacuation of the island was
completed. The United States flag was raised over the island at noon on
that day. The administration of its affairs has been provisionally
intrusted to a military governor until the Congress shall otherwise
provide. The Cuban Joint Commission has not yet terminated its labors.
Owing to the difficulties in the way of removing the large numbers of
Spanish troops still in Cuba, the evacuation can not be completed before
the 1st of January next.

Pursuant to the fifth article of the protocol, I appointed William R. Day,
lately Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and George
Gray, Senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid to be the peace
commissioners on the part of the United States. Proceeding in due season to
Paris, they there met on the 1st of October five commissioners similarly
appointed on the part of Spain. Their negotiations have made hopeful
progress, so that I trust soon to be able to lay a definitive treaty of
peace before the Senate, with a review of the steps leading to its
signature.

I do not discuss at this time the government or the future of the new
possessions which will come to us as the result of the war with Spain. Such
discussion will be appropriate after the treaty of peace shall be ratified.
In the meantime and until the Congress has legislated otherwise it will be
my duty to continue the military governments which have existed since our
occupation and give to the people security in life and property and
encouragement under a just and beneficent rule.

As soon as we are in possession of Cuba and have pacified the island it
will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a
government for themselves. This should be undertaken at the earliest moment
consistent with safety and assured success. It is important that our
relations with this people shall be of the most friendly character and our
commercial relations close and reciprocal. It should be our duty to assist
in every proper way to build up the waste places of the island, encourage
the industry of the people, and assist them to form a government which
shall be free and independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the
Cuban people.

Spanish rule must be replaced by a just, benevolent, and humane government,
created by the people of Cuba, capable of performing all international
obligations, and which shall encourage thrift, industry, and prosperity and
promote peace and good will among all of the inhabitants, whatever may have
been their relations in the past. Neither revenge nor passion should have a
place in the new government. Until there is complete tranquillity in the
island and a stable government inaugurated military occupation will be
continued.

With the one exception of the rupture with Spain, the intercourse of the
United States with the great family of nations has been marked with
cordiality, and the close of the eventful year finds most of the issues
that necessarily arise in the complex relations of sovereign states
adjusted or presenting no serious obstacle to a just and honorable solution
by amicable agreement.

A long unsettled dispute as to the extended boundary between the Argentine
Republic and Chile, stretching along the Andean crests from the southern
border of the Atacama Desert to Magellan Straits, nearly a third of the
length of the South American continent, assumed an acute stage in the early
part of the year, and afforded to this Government occasion to express the
hope that the resort to arbitration, already contemplated by existing
conventions between the parties, might prevail despite the grave
difficulties arising in its application. I am happy to say that
arrangements to this end have been perfected, the questions of fact upon
which the respective commissioners were unable to agree being in course of
reference to Her Britannic Majesty for determination. A residual difference
touching the northern boundary line across the Atacama Desert, for which
existing treaties provided no adequate adjustment, bids fair to be settled
in like manner by a joint commission, upon which the United States minister
at Buenos Ayres has been invited to serve as umpire in the last resort.

I have found occasion to approach the Argentine Government with a view to
removing differences of rate charges imposed upon the cables of an American
corporation in the transmission between Buenos Ayres and the cities of
Uruguay and Brazil of through messages passing from and to the United
States. Although the matter is complicated by exclusive concessions by
Uruguay and Brazil to foreign companies, there is strong hope that a good
understanding will be reached and that the important channels of commercial
communication between the United States and the Atlantic cities of South
America may be freed from an almost prohibitory discrimination.

In this relation I may be permitted to express my sense of the fitness of
an international agreement whereby the interchange of messages over
connecting cables may be regulated on a fair basis of uniformity. The world
has seen the postal system developed from a congeries of independent and
exclusive services into a well-ordered union, of which all countries enjoy
the manifold benefits. It would be strange were the nations not in time
brought to realize that modern civilization, which owes so much of its
progress to the annihilation of space by the electric force, demands that
this all-important means of communication be a heritage of all peoples, to
be administered and regulated in their common behoof. A step in this
direction was taken when the international convention of 1884 for the
protection of submarine cables was signed, and the day is, I trust, not far
distant when this medium for the transmission of thought from land to land
may be brought within the domain of international concert as completely as
is the material carriage of commerce and correspondence upon the face of
the waters that divide them.

The claim of Thomas Jefferson Page against Argentina, which has been
pending many years, has been adjusted. The sum awarded by the Congress of
Argentina was $4,242.35.

The sympathy of the American people has justly been offered to the ruler
and the people of Austria-Hungary by reason of the affliction that has
lately befallen them in the assassination of the Empress-Queen of that
historic realm.

On the 10th of September, 1897, a conflict took place at Lattimer, Pa.,
between a body of striking miners and the sheriff of Luzerne County and his
deputies, in which 22 miners were killed and 44 wounded, of whom 10 of the
killed and 12 of the wounded were Austrian and Hungarian subjects. This
deplorable event naturally aroused the solicitude of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, which, on the assumption that the killing and wounding involved
the unjustifiable misuse of authority, claimed reparation for the
sufferers. Apart from the searching investigation and peremptory action of
the authorities of Pennsylvania, the Federal Executive took appropriate
steps to learn the merits of the case, in order to be in a position to meet
the urgent complaint of a friendly power. The sheriff and his deputies,
having been indicted for murder, were tried, and acquitted, after
protracted proceedings and the hearing of hundreds of witnesses, on the
ground that the killing was in the line of their official duty to uphold
law and preserve public order in the State. A representative of the
Department of Justice attended the trial and reported its course fully.
With all the facts in its possession, this Government expects to reach a
harmonious understanding on the subject with that of Austria-Hungary,
notwithstanding the renewed claim of the latter, after learning the result
of the trial, for indemnity for its injured subjects.

Despite the brief time allotted for preparation, the exhibits of this
country at the Universal Exposition at Brussels in 1897 enjoyed the
singular distinction of a larger proportion of awards, having regard to the
number and classes of articles entered than those of other countries. The
worth of such a result in making known our national capacity to supply the
world's markets is obvious.

Exhibitions of this international character are becoming more frequent as
the exchanges of commercial countries grow more intimate and varied. Hardly
a year passes that this Government is not invited to national participation
at some important foreign center, but often on too short notice to permit
of recourse to Congress for the power and means to do so. My predecessors
have suggested the advisability of providing by a general enactment and a
standing appropriation for accepting such invitations and for
representation of this country by a commission. This plan has my cordial
approval.

I trust that the B